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Abstract 
In the context of a sharp rise in the incidence of poverty and increasing inequality since the 
end of the last decade, a major tax reform was put into place in mid-2007 with the explicit 
goals of promoting both greater efficiency and equity in the Uruguayan tax system. Overall, 
the reform substantially increased direct taxes on personal income by increasing marginal 
rates, lowered indirect taxes and direct taxes on firms, harmonized employer contributions to 
social security across sectors and eliminated some highly distortionary taxes. 
The joint effects of these changes on the macroeconomic equilibrium, labour markets, and 
poverty and inequality are assessed using a top-down static CGE, a microsimulation 
approach. It is shown that full implementation of the tax reform has substantial general 
equilibrium effects which generally strengthen the reduction of poverty incidences, poverty 
gaps and the severity of poverty exclusively due to the introduction of the personal income 
tax (without behavioural responses). Regarding poverty, the general equilibrium effects are 
significantly greater than the direct effects. Overall, we estimate a one-point reduction of the 
Gini index due to the reform. 
JEL classification: C15, D58, H20, I38 
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1. Introduction 
Uruguay has historically had lower poverty and inequality than the rest of the Latin-
American region, but trends in this regard have not been encouraging in recent years. The 
incidence of poverty declined significantly in the first half of the 1990s compared  to the 
previous decade. Unfortunately, this trend shifted into reverse in 1995, when the incidence 
of poverty began to climb, especially during the economic recession that began in 1999 and 
climaxed in 2002 with a severe financial crisis. Wages lost more than 20% of their 
purchasing power during this period  and the unemployment rate reached its historical 
maximum. 















rate of real wage 
(%) 
Annual growth 
rate of GDP (%) 
1990  3  29.7  30  8.5  -7.7  0.3 
1991  2.1  23.4  30  8.9  4.3  3.5 
1992  1.8  19.9  30  9.0  2.2  7.9 
1993  1.2  17.1  30  8.3  4.8  2.7 
1994  1.2  15.3  30  9.2  0.9  7.3 
1995  1.6  17.4  30  10.3  -2.6  -1.5 
1996  1.7  17.2  29  11.9  0.6  5.6 
1997  1.2  17.2  28  11.4  0.2  5.1 
1998  1.6  16.7  30  10.1  1.8  4.5 
1999  1.2  15.3  29  11.3  1.6  -2.8 
2000  1.5  17.8  30  13.6  -1.3  -1.4 
2001  1.3  18.8  30  15.3  -0.3  -3.4 
2002  2.0  24.3  31  17.0  -10.7  -11.0 
2003  3.0  31.3  33  16.9  -12.4  2.2 
2004  3.9  31.9  34  13.1  -0.1  11.8 
2005  3.4  29.8  34  12.2  4.6  6.6 
2006  2.1  26.8  32  11.4  4.4  7.0 
2007  2.1  25.5  32  9.6  4.8  7.4 
Source: National Institute of Statistics (INE), Central Bank of Uruguay (BCU). 
1/ Refers to urban population. Official estimates, using INE-2002 methodology. 
Extreme poverty line: the cost of the basket of basic food deemed necessary for an individual. Moderate poverty 
line: the cost of the basket of goods deemed necessary to live at the socially accepted minimum. 
Poverty gap: the distance of the poor below the poverty line, as a proportion of the line. 
In spite of strong post-crisis economic growth and reduced  unemployment,  the 
incidence of poverty is still high compared to the mid-nineties. In 2007, 25.5% of the urban 
population
1 was below the national poverty line, a higher percentage than in 1991. Post-
crisis poverty reduction did not lower the Gini inequality index. Indeed, the economic crisis 
favoured a concentration of income as shown in Figure 1. 
 
                                                 
1 The rural population in Uruguay is only 6.3% of total population.   3 





















Source: Developed from the National Household Survey, National Institute of Statistics (INE). 
It was in this context that the government that took office in March 2005 sent a tax 
reform bill to congress. The bill was passed in January 2007 and came into force by mid-
2007.
2 It was the first structural tax reform in 30 years and the government expected it to 
play an important role in income redistribution. 
Some studies have focused on analyzing the effects of the pre-reform tax scheme on 
the distribution of income (Grau and Lagomarsino, 2002; Perazzo, Robino and Vigna, 2002). 
The focus of other studies was to propose and evaluate tax reforms (Barreix and Roca, 
2003 and 2006; Grau, Lorenzo and Oddone, 2004). 
Recently, Amarante, Arim and Salas (2007) analyzed the poverty and inequality 
impacts that the 2007 tax reform had on disposable household incomes (via changes in 
value added taxes  and direct income taxes)  by  applying  an arithmetical microsimulation 
approach. Their analysis of the tax change finds redistributive effects: the pre-reform tax 
system was practically neutral when viewed in terms of inequality, while the new tax system 
is progressive and  has a small and positive impact on inequality. This is because  the 
reduced value added tax is less regressive and direct taxes are now more progressive. They 
also find that the changes in value added and direct income taxation have a somewhat 
positive impact on the incidence of poverty.  This  impact is largely  explained by price 
reductions  resulting from  the change in the  value added tax, a change that  these 
researchers assumed to have been entirely translated into consumer prices. 
                                                 
2 Uruguayan Law Nº 18 083, known as the Tax System Reform.    4 
Although these studies indicate substantial progress in understanding of Uruguayan 
tax policy and the impacts of such policy, they are all based on partial equilibrium analysis 
and are mainly arithmetical microsimulations. However, a policy shock such as the tax 
reforms of 2007 could lead to changes in the behaviour of agents, induce reallocation of 
resources and generate feedback effects on household income, consumption and savings. 
This study aims to assess the impact of the four main changes introduced by this tax reform 
by using a methodology that accounts for general equilibrium effects. These changes are: a) 
introduction of a new income tax on households; b) changes in the  tax base and value 
added tax rates along with elimination of two other indirect taxes on goods; c) modification of 
labour taxes by harmonizing employers’ contribution rate to social security across sectors; 
and d) a reduction in direct taxes  on firms by  introducing  the FDIRTAX
3  (which  mainly 
replaces the PROFTAX
4). 
With the goal of evaluating the effects of these four main components of the reforms, 
a static computable general equilibrium model (CGE) was built  and then linked to a 
microsimulation model to capture the macro-micro links. The effects of the main tax changes 
on  (aggregate and sectoral) output and employment on the fiscal balance, poverty and 
inequality are then assessed. 
2. Brief description of the Uruguayan tax system and main features of the tax 
reform 
2.1 The pre-reform tax structure 
Before the 2007 tax reform, the Uruguayan tax system included a large variety of 
taxes, a few of which formed the bulk of tax revenues. The most important of these were the 
value added tax (VAT), an excise tax
5 and a tax on profits. Nearly 70% of fiscal revenues 
(excluding social security taxes) originated from the VAT and the excise tax, while the tax on 
profits accounted for a further 13% of these revenues. The pre-reform direct income tax on 
labour and pensions
6 amounted to 5% of total fiscal revenues. 
Before the reform, Uruguay had one of the highest value added tax rates in Latin 
America (Perazzo Robino and Vigna 2002). The effective tax rate differed among goods, 
                                                 
3 Impuesto a la Renta de las Actividades Económicas (Tax on Profits of Economic Activities).  
4 Impuesto a la Renta de la Industria y el Comercio (Tax on Profits of Industry and Commerce).  
5 Impuesto Específico Interno (Specific Domestic Tax),an excise tax on certain goods (tobacco, fuel, 
beverages, sugar, vehicles, and cosmetics). 
6 Impuesto a las Retribuciones Personales (Tax on Salaries and Pensions).   5 
with  three different VAT rates: the basic rate  that most goods are taxed at (23%), the 
minimum rate (14%) and a third set of goods that were exempted from the VAT. Despite 
these high tax rates, exempted goods were a large share of total consumption (nearly 40%, 
according to Amarante, Arim and Vigorito, 2007). 
A large number of sales taxes only contributed a small share of fiscal revenues, most 
of  which  were eliminated under  the current reform. Two of these eliminated taxes  are 
particularly worth mentioning: an intermediate consumption tax
7 and health tax
8. The 3% 
intermediate consumption tax was meant to finance the increasing social security deficit and 
thus  worked as a  tax  on economic activities that increased the cost of intermediate 
consumption, possibly increasing prices. The health tax was a 5% specific tax on health 
services which were exempt from the VAT, which implied that health services could not 
deduct value added taxes paid on intermediate inputs. The effect was higher costs for these 
services. 
At the international level, tax rates in Uruguay were low for income and profits and 
were high for goods and services. According to Perazzo, Robino and Vigna (2002) only 28% 
of Uruguayan tax revenues in the late nineties were collected from direct income taxes, 
while the share was much higher in developed countries (for example, 89% for the USA and 
63% for Germany). Indeed, the Uruguayan share of revenues from direct taxes was much 
lower than in other South American countries  (such as 42% for  Argentina  and 53% for 
Brazil. The incidence of the direct income tax  (was much lower than in other countries, and 
it was only applied on wages and pensions as opposed to revenues from financial and real-
estate capital, which were not taxed. As such, the system did not respect the criterion of 
horizontal equity (Barreix and Roca, 2003). 
In terms of its distributive impact, preceding studies pointed out the regressive nature 
of the pre-reform tax structure (Grau and Lagomarsino, 2002; Barreix and Roca, 2003). 
Firstly, the personal tax was a progressive tax on wages and pensions, reflected by an 
average tax rate that increased with the tax base. It was not, however, a progressive tax on 
household income as a whole  because  capital income is  a higher share of income in 
wealthier  households, but was not taxed. Secondly, the effective VAT rate by decile of 
                                                 
7 Contribución al Financiamiento de la Seguridad Social (Contribution to the Financing of Social 
Security). 
8 Impuesto Específico a los Servicios de Salud (Specific Tax on Health Services).   6 
household income clearly shows that this tax is regressive due to the relatively high share of 
consumption in total household income in the lower deciles. 
Finally, social security charges include contributions  from both  employers and 
employees, each of whom faces  different pension and health insurance tax rates. The 
employer contribution (which was modified under the 2007 reform) consisted of a pension 
tax and a health insurance tax, respectively equal to 12.5% and 5% of payroll, for an overall 
employer contribution to social security (ECSS) of 17.5% of gross wages. This contribution 
was sector-specific as some sectors were exempted and others were taxed at considerably 
higher rates than those of the general regime.
9 
In sum, preceding studies pointed out that the pre-reform tax structure was complex, 
regressive and specific to sector of activity and source of income. A high share of fiscal 
revenues came from consumption taxes, taxes which depend on source of income, and 
numerous taxes that were a small portion of the public tax take. In terms of the distributive 
effects of tax policy, preceding studies showed that there was scope to use the tax structure 
as an instrument for redistribution. 
2.2 Main features of the 2007 tax reform 
The explicit goals of the 2007 tax reform are: i) to promote greater equity in the tax 
structure by linking the tax burden to each agent’s taxpaying capacity, ii) to promote greater 
efficiency of the tax scheme and iii) to stimulate investment and employment. 
To these ends, the main reforms involved: a) introduction of a direct personal income 
tax
10 to replace the previous wages and pensions tax; b) changes in the tax base and rates 
of the VAT along with elimination of the intermediate consumption tax and the health tax; c) 
modified labour taxes, through a harmonized employer contribution rate to social security 
(payroll taxes) across sectors; and d) introduction of the direct tax on firms which largely 
replaced the industry and trade tax. Also, in order to simplify the tax structure, twelve taxes 
totalling approximately 20% of total fiscal revenues were eliminated.
11 The direct personal 
                                                 
9  Manufacturing and passenger transportation were exempted from the pension contribution; 
electricity and the public petroleum refiner paid 6.5%; the rate for public sector activities and for public 
enterprises were respectively 19.5% and 24.5%. Construction was taxed at a fixed rate of 76% that 
included both personal and employer contributions plus financing of other benefits received by 
workers. Finally, a special regime was in place for rural activities, with the tax applied on productive 
land and not on labour. 
10 Impuesto a la Renta de las Personas Físicas, (IRPF in Spanish). 
11 The other eliminated taxes are: Tax on Banks Assets (IMABA), Tax on Financial System Control 
(ICOSIFI), the health tax on small enterprises (IPEQUE), Tax on Commissions (ICOM), Tax on   7 
income tax is a dual tax which treats capital and labour income differently. Capital revenues 
are taxed at 3-12% (depending on  source  of income). Taxes on labour income are 
nonlinear, with minimum non-taxable income and marginal tax rates ranging from 10-25% 
according to tax bases defined in terms of the BPC (Basis for Contributive Benefits).
12 The 
direct income tax allows medical costs to be deducted for both children under the age of 18 
and pensioners and it also allows social security payments to be deducted.
13 These items 
can be deducted to determine taxes on labour income and pensions but cannot be used as 
deductions against capital income. Table 2 presents the bases and rates of direct income 
tax on labour and pensions together with the previous wages and pensions tax and table 3 
shows the new rates on capital income. 
Table 2: Bases and rates of direct personal income tax and the wage and income tax 
Direct personal income tax on labour income  Wages and pension tax 
Monthly income
*  Tax 
rate  Income  Monthly income    Tax rate  Income 
Up to 5 BPC  Exempt 
Wages              
Pensions                 
Non wage 
remunerations 
Up to 3 BPC    Exempt 
Wages  More than 5 and up to 10 BPC  10% 
More than 3 and up to 6 
BPC 
 
  2% 
More than 10 and up to 15 BPC  15%  More than 6 BPC    6% 
More than 15 and up to 50 BPC  20%  Up to 6 BPC   
Exempt 
Pensions 
More than 50 and up to 100 BPC  22% 
More than 6 BPC    2% 
More than 100 BPC  25%            
* Although the personal income tax is an annual tax, it is expressed on a monthly basis to make it comparable to 
the wages and pensions tax. 




                                                                                                                                                         
Telecommunications (ITEL), Tax on Credit Cards (ITC), Tax on Forced Sales (IVF), Tax on 
Agricultural and Farming Activities (IRA), Tax on Sportsmen, Tax on Auction Sales, Tax on Contests 
and Competitions (ICSC). The reforms also anticipate gradual elimination of the Tax on the Purchase 
of Foreign Currency (ICOME) and other minor taxes. 
12 The BPC is a unit of account that is adjusted according to average wage growth. The nominal value 
of the BPC was 1636 Uruguayan pesos (approx. 74 dollars) in January 2007. 
13 In the first case, the contributor is able to deduct 6.5 annual BPC for each child. In the case of 
pensioners, the allowed deductions for medical care are 12 annual BPC.   8 
Table 3: Bases and rates of personal income taxes on capital 
Concept    Tax rate Income 
Interest on deposits over one year in financial institution    3% 
 
 
Pure revenues from  
capital 
Interest on deposits, under a year in financial institutions     5% 
Interest on bonds and other debt securities, longer than three-
year maturity 
 
  3% 
Distributed profits    7% 
Other rents    12% 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on data from the Ministry of Economics and Finance  
The changes in the VAT consisted in reducing the base rate from 23% to 22% and 
the  minimum rate from 14% to 10%. Also, some goods that were exempted before the 
reform are taxed at the minimum rate or at the base rate in the post-reform situation.
14 The 
sales tax on health services and the tax on intermediate consumption of goods were also 
eliminated. 
On the other hand, the reform established a uniform employer pension contribution 
rate of 7.5% for industrial, commercial and services  sectors, as well as for public 
enterprises. The health insurance rate is still sits at 5%, for an overall ECSS rate of 12.5% in 
the post-reform situation as opposed to the pre-reform rate of 17.5%. The 19.5% tax rate for 
public sector activities remains the same, as does  the exemption for passenger 
transportation. Pre-reform and post-reform ECSS rates by sector and value added tax rates 
by  commodity  (defined as any  category of goods and services subject to the VAT)  are 
presented in table 4. 
Finally, the previous tax on profits was relatively high at 30% of profits. The actual 
level of this tax was sector-specific: some activities were exempt and others paid the full tax 
rate. The reform studied in this paper aimed for a more neutral system by reducing the tax 
rate to 25% and standardizing it across all sectors. Dividends distributed to households are 
charged  an additional 7% in the form of a  direct personal income tax on capital, which 




                                                 
14 E.g. health services and passengers transportation are taxed at the minimum rate while tobacco is 
taxed at the basic rate.   9 
Table 4: Employer contribution to social security and value added tax rates: pre- and 
post-reform 
Sectors 
Employer contribution to social security  Value added tax 
Pre reform  Reform  Pre reform Reform 
Primary except livestock  -----  -----  9.8%  15.4% 
Livestock  -----  -----  0.0%  0.0% 
Meat, fruit & veg.  5.0%  12.5%  23.0%  22.0% 
Mills, sugar & vegetable oils  5.0%  12.5%  14.0%  10.0% 
Dairy  5.0%  12.5%  8.6%  12.4% 
Other food industry  5.0%  12.5%  21.5%  20.0% 
Press  5.0%  12.5%  0.0%  0.0% 
Petroleum refining  6.5%  7.5%  5.9%  4.2% 
Pharmaceutical industry  5.0%  12.5%  14.0%  10.0% 
Metal products and machinery  5.0%  12.5%  22.3%  21.4% 
Other manufacturing  5.0%  12.5%  23.0%  22.0% 
Electricity and gas  6.5%  7.5%  `  22.0% 
Water  24.5%  7.5%  0.0%  0.0% 
Construction  32.6%  23.3%  0.0%  0.0% 
Commerce  17.5%  12.5%  16.0%  15.8% 
Hotels  17.5%  12.5%  14.0%  10.0% 
Passenger transport  0.0%  0.0%  14.0%  10.0% 
Communications  24.5%  7.5%  23.0%  22.0% 
Financial services  17.5%  12.5%  0.0%  0.0% 
Public administration  19.5%  19.5%  0.0%  0.0% 
Private education  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 
Hospitals  17.5%  12.5%  0.0%  10.0% 
Other health services  17.5%  12.5%  0.0%  22.0% 
Other services  17.5%  12.5%  23.0%  22.0% 
Source: Authors’ elaboration based on data from the Social Security Bank and the Ministry of Economics and 
Finance 
 
2.3 Expected effects 
Implementation of the direct personal income tax  directly affects the household 
budget constraint. Households in the first eight deciles of the income distribution have more 
disposable income following the reform whereas households in the two richest deciles have 
less disposable income. This is particularly the case for the wealthiest. The progressivity of 
the personal income tax is more pronounced than the previous tax on wages and pensions, 
not only because of the different rates applied to labour income, but also due to the fact that 
gross labour income of the self-employed and capital income are both taxed through the 
personal income tax in the post-reform situation.
15 
                                                 
15 Although income from self-employment and professional income were taxed by the tax on wages 
and pensions, the rates applied were at a fixed, and generally very low, base.   10 
The main expected household behavioural responses to variations in their budget 
constraint include changes in consumption and labour supply.
16 Following the shock of the 
new tax rates, optimal consumption demand and labour supply change for each household 
type. If labour supply and consumption effects arising from implementation of the new 
income tax  are sufficiently large, we may expect to see changes in price and wage 
structures. Household consumption demand for goods and services is likely to change 
across household deciles, both because of the different sign of the variation of disposable 
income  (richer households experienced a reduction of disposable income and poorer 
households saw income increase) and because income elasticities of demand differ among 
households for different goods. Also, after the shock, net wages for households in the first 
eight deciles are expected to be higher. This increases the opportunity cost of leisure, which 
induces an increase in labour supply, so long as the substitution effect is larger than the 
income effect. This can be contrasted with an expected reduction of labour supply from 
wealthier households. The size of this latter effect depends strongly on the wage elasticity of 
labour supply. 
The expected general equilibrium effects are captured through variations in relative 
prices of goods. Also, as sectors of activity face changing demand for their goods or 
services, factor demand from each sector is likely to change, affecting wage rates and 
employment. 
The CGE model captures the price effect of a change in the value added tax: a 
modified VAT rate results in new market clearing prices and quantities via consumer and 
producer optimization, likely leading to a change in the sectoral structure of the economy. 
This is also expected because the size and sign of the shock are different across types of 
goods, so the income effects of the change in the VAT will differ by household type. In 
principle, we can expect poorer households to enjoy a greater positive effect because the 
minimum rate declines by more than the basic rate under the reforms. 
The employer contribution to social security is a part of labour costs in each sector. A 
decrease (increase) in the cost of hiring workers should push up (down) labour demand. The 
magnitude of these variations will depend on the elasticities of substitution between 
production factors and the share of labour in total costs for each sector of activity. Regarding 
                                                 
16 In the long run, non-linear tax rates on income may also induce negative effects on human capital 
accumulation by lowering the wage premium for the more educated. This effect is not considered, as 
the analysis is developed in a static framework.   11 
the shock, lower labour costs can be expected to increase labour demand in the commerce- 
and service-oriented  sectors  and  also  in construction, while the opposite holds in 
manufacturing sectors. The increase in labour demand in the first three types of sectors 
could push up wages. If the fall in labour demand in the manufacturing sector is outweighed 
by the increase in labour demand in the other sectors, an increase in overall wages or a 
decrease in unemployment can also be expected. 
Finally, the reduction of the tax rate for non-distributed profits associated with 
implementation of the direct tax on firms should affect returns to capital. This would affect 
relative factor prices as well as the level and allocation of new investment. 
It is worth mentioning that, due to the static nature of the model used here, the 
effects that the direct tax has on firms’ capital accumulation are not assessed even though 
the main objective of modifying this tax has to do with capital accumulation. A full account of 
the effects of the direct tax on firms would require a dynamic model, a possible extension of 
the current work. In this study, the final effects of the introducing the direct tax on firms as 
part of the full reform (i.e., the combination of all the taxes included in the reforms) are 
considered, but an exhaustive analysis of its own impact is not attempted. 
3. Methodology and data 
The adopted methodology has two main components: a static computable general 
equilibrium model (CGE) and a microsimulation procedure to evaluate the effects on poverty 
and inequality by accounting for the distribution of income. 
3.1 The data 
For the purpose of this study, a new 2006 benchmark Social Accounting Matrix 
(SAM) was built using the most recent Supply and Use Tables published by the Central 
Bank (with 1997 data), 2006 National Accounts data, 2006 Household Survey data (which 
includes information on both urban and rural households) and complementary data about 
fiscal revenues. To calibrate the model, the SAM was disaggregated by: a) household type, 
to capture different consumption profiles, different sources of income and variations in the 
way households are affected by the new structure of personal income taxes; b) sector of 
activity, to capture variations in how sectors are affected by changes in the VAT and ECSS; 
and c) labour, to capture how the effects of the direct personal income tax vary with skill 
level. The data was disaggregated to model the taxes in detail.   12 
The final SAM includes 24 sectors of economic activity (and 24 goods) aggregated 
according to VAT and ECSS rates. Three types of labour are considered: those with less 
than completed secondary education (unskilled); those with less than completed post-
secondary education (semi-skilled) and those who have completed a level of post-secondary 
education (skilled). There is only one type of capital  factor, which includes land.  The 
composition of value added in Uruguay is shown in table 5. 
 















Source: SAM 2006  
There are 13 tax accounts, one for each of the taxes that were specifically 
considered, including those paid by institutions on the sales of commodities and in relation 
to economic activities and factors. Table 6 shows the different taxes included and their share 




  Skilled labour Semiskilled labour Unskilled labour Capital 
Primary except livestock  1.0%  1.5%  4.4%  1.1% 
Livestock  3.4%  3.6%  9.2%  7.5% 
Meat, fruit & veg.  0.5%  1.2%  2.5%  2.4% 
Mills, sugar & vegetable oils  0.1%  0.3%  0.5%  0.3% 
Dairy  0.2%  0.7%  0.8%  0.9% 
Other food industry  0.6%  1.0%  2.6%  2.2% 
Press  0.8%  1.0%  0.7%  0.4% 
Petroleum refining  0.7%  0.7%  0.2%  8.4% 
Pharmaceutical industry  1.5%  1.2%  0.5%  0.1% 
Metal products and machinery  0.9%  1.7%  2.0%  2.1% 
Other manufacturing  2.5%  4.4%  6.2%  6.0% 
Electricity and gas  1.8%  1.5%  1.0%  3.6% 
Water  0.4%  0.4%  1.1%  0.2% 
Construction  1.5%  2.1%  7.8%  7.1% 
Commerce  6.5%  18.5%  18.3%  8.9% 
Hotels  0.4%  0.6%  0.7%  2.3% 
Passenger transport  0.3%  2.2%  3.5%  0.5% 
Communications  1.7%  2.0%  1.2%  3.7% 
Financial services  6.4%  8.7%  2.3%  11.9% 
Public administration  26.7%  18.8%  13.8%  0.0% 
Private education  4.2%  3.2%  0.6%  1.1% 
Hospitals  11.1%  4.5%  2.3%  1.8% 
Other health services  5.0%  1.5%  0.7%  0.5% 
Other services  21.9%  18.7%  17.2%  27.0% 
Total  100%  100%  100%  100%   13 
Table 6: Taxes included in the CGE model (%) 
Taxes  % Tax revenue % GDP 
Labour income tax 
(1)  4.1%  1.0% 
Capital income tax  0.0%  0.0% 
Pensions tax  0.4%  0.1% 
Employer contribution to social security  14.9%  3.7% 
Factor tax  9.0%  2.3% 
Direct tax on firms  11.5%  2.6% 
Taxes on products  10.8%  2.5% 
Tariffs  4.3%  1.1% 
Activity Taxes  2.9%  0.7% 
Value added tax  39.2%  10.0% 
Tax on intermediate consumption of goods  2.8%  0.7% 
Total  100%  24.7% 
Source: SAM 2006 
(1) Includes taxes on the three types of labour 
Households are disaggregated by  decile of household income. The institutional 
accounts also include a representative firm, the government and the rest of the world. The 
SAM includes a savings and investment account. 
The decision to disaggregate households by decile of household income was made 
to minimize heterogeneity of effective income tax rates within each household group and to 
maximize it between groups. Disaggregating households by income is the best way to 
achieve this goal because effective income tax rates (on labour and pensions) vary with 
income. Similarly, disaggregating labour by skill level allows us to further disaggregate 
effective tax rates  within  household types since labour endowments clearly vary across 
households in terms of skill levels. This specification is relevant because, despite the fact 
that tax rates are not defined by skill, there is obviously a high correlation between skill and 
income. 
In order to calibrate the model and to specify the simulated shock on labour and 
pension income taxes, an arithmetical microsimulation was carried out. Based on (observed) 
market incomes and socio-demographic household characteristics, this analysis 
arithmetically derives net household tax payments and thus the effective tax rates under the 
post-reform tax system. Effective tax rates on labour, pension and capital were obtained for 
each household type by dividing total tax payments by total income for each household type. 
Effective rates thus account for tax evasion (or informality). It is assumed that tax evasion 
does not change following the reform, so evasion is held at its initial level in the model. A 
detailed description of the arithmetical microsimulation is presented in the technical 
appendix.   14 
In addition to the SAM, the database includes various  elasticities for production, 
consumption, trade and labour supply, along with the wage-unemployment elasticity (see 
table A.1 in the annex for their respective values). Data on labour stocks were drawn from 
the 2006 National Household Survey (NHS), disaggregated by skill level, sector of activity 
and the initial unemployment rate for each skill level. The average unemployment rate was 
nearly 11% in 2006, while unemployment decreased with workers’ skill level. Calibration of 
parameters in the labour supply equation follows the process used by Annabi (2003). 
 
3.2 The general equilibrium model 
The CGE model is based on the standard model used by Löfgren, Harris and 
Robinson (2002). A number of modifications were made to the standard model to account 
for the main effects of the tax reform. Those modifications pertain to: a) treatment of the 
VAT; b) modelling of the specific tax on intermediate consumption of goods; c) modelling of 
income taxes; d) modelling of employer contributions to social security; e) the choice of the 
production function; and f) modelling of the labour market. The main components of the 
model  are described  in the present section,  as are these modifications. A detailed 
description of all the equations is included in a technical appendix that is available from the 
authors upon request. 
3.2.1 Main features of the CGE model 
The model has the following general characteristics: 
1.  A  Leontief specification is used to combine value added and intermediate 
consumption. Value added is in turn modelled with a nested CES (constant elasticity 
of  substitution) function that considers a combined labour and capital  production 
factor. 
2.  Domestic and imported goods are imperfect substitutes in the domestic market so an 
Armington specification is used. 
3.  Domestic producers choose to export or to sell in the domestic market according to a 
CET (constant  elasticity of transformation) function. The small open economy 
assumption is adopted, so the economy is a price-taker in foreign markets. 
4.  Household consumption expenditures  are  distributed between goods  and leisure 
according to a Stone-Geary utility function.   15 
5.  Firms receive capital payments, pay taxes and transfer most of the net benefits to 
households, and only keep non distributed profits. 
6.  The government collects taxes and tariffs, purchases goods, makes transfers to 
households (mostly relating to social security), and makes interest payments on 
loans received from the rest of the world or for bonds traded either on domestic 
markets or abroad. 
7.  The labour market is segmented into three categories of workers: skilled, semiskilled 
and unskilled. Endogenous labour supply and a wage curve are introduced. 
8.  The consumer price index is the numeraire. 
 
3.2.2 Treatment of the value added tax (VAT) and tax on intermediate 
consumption of goods 
We modified the standard model by Lögfren et al. (2002) by specifying a value added 
tax on commodities with rebates for intermediate inputs as per  Go  et al.  (2005),  which 
means that the VAT does not have cascading effects. It is assumed that commodities (c) are 
taxed at the corresponding (basic or minimum) rate regardless of whether they are final or 
intermediate transactions. Rebates are then introduced, so producers can deduct taxes paid 
on intermediate consumption. Sales of imports are taxed and do not receive rebates, while 
exports are not subject to the VAT. Total public revenues from the value added tax is then: 
∑ +
c
c c c c QQ tq PQS VAT ) 1 ( -∑
a




VATc    is the effective value-added tax rate on commodity c 
PQSc    is the supply price of composite commodity c 
tqc    is the excise tax rate on commodity c 
QQ c    is the quantity of composite goods supplied of commodity c 
REBATEa  is the value added rebate for intermediate consumption of activity a, where: 
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c
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where: 
  
QINTc,a is the quantity of intermediate demand for c from activity a. 
The demand price of commodity c includes the value added tax and the 
corresponding tax on commodities (the excise or health tax): 
PQDc = PQSc(1+tqc )(1+VATc)   16 
where: 
 
PQDc    is the demand price of composite commodity c 
Finally, the price of aggregate intermediate inputs includes the per unit rebate for the 
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PINTAa  is the aggregate intermediate consumption price for activity a 
icacgood,a  is intermediate consumption of goods cgood per unit of aggregate 
    intermediate consumption by sector of economic activity a 
icacngood,a  is the intermediate consumption of services cngood per unit of aggregate 
intermediate consumption by activity a 
tsstax    is the tax rate on intermediate consumption of goods 
QINTAa  is the quantity of aggregate intermediate consumption by activity a 
The tax on intermediate inputs collected by government is: 
tsstax QINT PQD a cgood
a Cgood
cgood ,
, ∑  
In order to calibrate the model, it is initially assumed that the legal VAT rate following 
the reform is actually paid on the sale value of each commodity. The rebate on intermediate 
consumption for each production activity is calculated using input-output data. These values 
are then adjusted by a scaling factor to ensure that total VAT revenues match tax revenues 
as reported by the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF). This procedure yields effective 
VAT rates which accounts for tax evasion, which is presumed to be proportional across all 
sectors. 
In order to carry out the simulations, the effective VAT rates were specified as the 
product of the new legal rates and a fixed factor (representing tax evasion), as follows: 




VATADJ c  is the value added tax-scaling factor for commodity c 
c vat   is the legal value added tax rate on commodity c   17 
So, in the corresponding simulations,  c vat is changed and the scaling factor remains 
fixed. This means that the level of tax evasion is held at its initial level which implies that tax 
evasion does not change as a result of the reform. 
3.2.3 Specification of household income taxes 
The standard model by Lofgren, Harris and Robinson (2002) provides a single direct 
tax on domestic institutions’ total income. In our case, the direct tax on households was 
calculated according to income source and labour type, via five types of tax: a) a direct tax 
on household income derived from skilled labour; b) a direct tax on household income from 
semi-skilled labour; c) a direct tax on household income from unskilled labour; d) a direct tax 
on household capital income; and e) a direct tax on household pension income.
17 
3.2.4 Specification of production functions and employer contributions to social 
security 
Employer contributions to social security differ across sectors  in the baseline 
situation. The reform scenario introduces the ECSS as a sector-specific tax paid on labour 
costs. 
On the production side, value added is modelled using a nested CES technology. 
The three labour factors are combined into a composite labour factor, which is in turn 
combined with capital. Employer contributions to social security are introduced in the CES 
equation that combines composite labour and capital (note that the rate does not differ by 
labour type). Factor remuneration may differ across activities due to a fixed distortion factor 
calibrated from the SAM and labour stock data. 
The ECSS and VAT rates are treated similarly. The effective rates are specified as 
the product of the legal rate and a fixed scaling factor representing tax evasion: 




TSfact,a   is the effective ECSS rate on the factor (fact) used in activity a 
TSADJfact,a   is an adjustment parameter for the tax on fact used in activity a 
a fact ts ,   is the legal ECSS rate on fact used in activity a 
                                                 
17 Income must be distinguished by source because the new direct personal income tax treats income 
from labour, capital and pensions differently. Distinguishing between the tax rates for different labour 
types allows us to proxy for tax rates that vary with income level.   18 
In this case, tax evasion is a function of the number of informal workers and wages in 
each sector as obtained from the 2006 NHS. An estimate of total tax evasion is calculated 
as the difference between theoretical revenues (if the legal rates were actually applied) and 
actual revenues reported by the Social Security Bank (BPS). 
3.2.5 Labour market specification 
Modelling  the labour market is a crucial aspect  of this study  because  the labour 
market is the main way that the results of the CGE can influence the microsimulations. 
Labour supply was endogenized by allowing changes in disposable income to affect labour 
supply. Unemployment was also introduced by adding a wage curve. 
As mentioned earlier, unemployment rates are relatively high in the Uruguayan 
labour market and also differ by labour  type. This necessitates consideration of 
unemployment when modelling the labour market. Equilibrium on the labour market thus 
differs from a strict micro-theoretic definition. Nevertheless, the solution provided by the 
model guarantees that the resulting unemployment rate is consistent with the wage rate 
prevailing in each market via a wage curve (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1995). This wage 
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where 
WFf     is the wage for labour factor f 
awcf    is a scaling parameter 
UNf    is the unemployment rate for factor f  
welasf   is the elasticity of wages to unemployment 
CPI    is the consumer price index 
The concept of the wage curve typically indicates a negatively sloped relationship 
between the unemployment rate and the real wage rate, and is associated with non-
competitive labour market behaviour. This non-competitive behaviour may be explained by 
the existence of efficiency wages or union bargaining. The efficiency wage theory argues 
that firms motivate workers by offering higher wages to promote effort or to reduce turnover 
rates. If unemployment increases, the wage premium required to improve worker efficiency 
declines. The wage curve in the Uruguayan economy is also consistent with union 
bargaining models. These models show that union power increases when unemployment is 
low, a situation that tends to increase wages.   19 
The presence of a  negative wage elasticity with respect to unemployment is 
incorporated by introducing a wage curve for each segment of the labour market. Elasticities 
are taken from Bucheli and Gonzalez (2007), who provided empirical estimates for Uruguay. 
Their estimates indicate that unemployment does not significantly affect wages for skilled 
workers (the estimated elasticity is -0.034 and is not significantly different from zero). This 
relationship is more notable for both unskilled and semiskilled workers, however. The 
estimated elasticity with respect to unemployment is -0.145 for unskilled workers, somewhat 
greater than the elasticity of -0.139 estimated for semiskilled workers. 
Introducing  endogenous labour supply to  the CGE model  is accomplished by 
including leisure in the set of consumption goods. Following Annabi (2003), it is assumed 
that leisure is a normal good with an opportunity cost equal to the wage rate. An increase in 
wages  raises the opportunity cost of leisure and induces consumers  to work more (the 
substitution effect). On the other hand, the increase in the wage rate raises real income, 
increasing the consumption of normal goods including leisure (the income effect). The total 
effect on labour supply takes the form of a backward-bending curve: the substitution effect is 
greater than the income effect at lower wages, whereas the income effect is stronger at 
higher wage rates. 
Each representative household in this study is endowed with the three types of 
labour. This means that not only are we faced with the problem of how to model the labour-
leisure decision, but we must also deal with the question of which type of labour will vary. 
This is done by assuming that each household is endowed with three budgets (one for each 
type of labour) to allocate between work and leisure, as per Decaluwé, Lemelin and Bahan 
(2006). 
Each household is treated as though  it were composed of a maximum of three 
members (one per type of labour), where each member maximizes their own utility 
regardless of other members’ decisions. Minimum levels of leisure and consumption are 
both assumed in the utility function. 
The following equation refers to supply of each  labour type  from household h, 
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QFACINS h,lab     is the quantity of labour type lab supplied by household h  
MAXHOUR hflab   is the total available time of labour type lab in household h 
Zeta lab,h  is the share of leisure in the utility function of labour type lab for 
household h 
ch γ    is the minimum consumption level of commodity c in household h 
UNlab      is the unemployment rate of labour type lab 
THLAB lab,h    is the direct tax rate on income of labour type lab of household h 
WFfab      is the economy-wide average wage for labour type lab 
Notice that the net wage rate is replaced by the “expected” wage rate, corrected by 
unemployment rate.  It is thus  assumed that the representative agents adjust for the 
probability of finding employment  when maximizing their utility. Calibration was done 
following Annabi (2003). 
 
3.3 The microsimulation model 
The simulation with the CGE model illustrates the effects of the tax reform at the 
macro level. To go from the counterfactual effects simulated with the CGE model to the 
distribution of poverty and income at the household level, we adopt the methodology 
presented in Ganuza, Paes de Barros and Vos (2002),  itself  an adaptation of the 
methodology proposed by Almeida dos Reis and Paes de Barros (1991).
18 It consists of 
simulating, at the micro level, the labour market and income structure obtained from the 
CGE macro simulations. To this end, micro data from the 2006 NHS was used to obtain 
poverty and inequality indicators which are consistent with the simulated structure. The 
approach can thus be described as “top-down” because the policy shock leads to changes 
in factor prices, the structure of unemployment and employment, the extent of poverty and 
inequality, and it is assumed that there are no additional feedback effects. 
                                                 
18 The origins of this type of counterfactual microsimulation can be found in Orcutt (1957), Oaxaca 
(1973) and Blinder (1973). In the case of Uruguay, this methodology has been used in Laens and 
Perera (2004), Terra et al. (2006) and Laens and Llambí (2008).   21 
The counterfactual microsimulation methodology follows a non parametric technique. 
It does not specify income and labour-choice models as proposed in Bourguignon, Fournier 
and Gurgand (2001) or in Bourguignon, Ferreira and Lustig (2001). Instead, it assumes that 
occupational shifts may be approximated by a random selection procedure within a 
segmented labour market structure. A Monte Carlo procedure can then be used to obtain 
confidence intervals for the outcomes of the simulations (poverty and inequality coefficients). 
The important assumption made is that, on average, the effects of the random changes 
within segments correctly reflect the impact of the actual changes in the labour market. 
Individuals are defined according to skill to form the three labour categories in the 
CGE, while the 24 sectors of activity in the CGE model were aggregated into 7 sectors. 
These aggregated sectors are: a) primary; b) manufacturing; c) construction; d) commerce; 
e) electricity, gas, water and public administration;
19  f) transport, communications and 
services; and g) private education and health services. 
The microsimulations involve the following sequence of steps: i) labour supply 
adjustment; ii) unemployment rate adjustment; iii) sectoral employment change; iv) relative 
wage changes between types of labour; v) average wage changes; and vi) capital income 
changes, equal to the simulated variation of the price of capital in the CGE model. Capital 
income is simulated at the household level rather than at the individual level. The sequence 
of the microsimulation method is similar to the one followed by Ganuza, Paes de Barros and 
Vos (2002), except they did not account for changes in capital income. Although the results 
obtained from this methodology are path dependent in principle, some sensitivity analysis 
suggests that the results are robust to the selected sequence of changes.
20 
It is important to note that after-tax incomes are observed in the NHS, so pre-tax 
incomes must be estimated in the first stage of the microsimulation. The new after-tax 
incomes of individuals (and thereby disposable household income) are then estimated by 
accounting for the new direct tax system. The initial picture of a change in direct income 
taxes on households can be seen by comparing after-tax household income for the pre-
reform and simulated situations. This can be viewed as the “next day” effect of the reform to 
the direct income tax because agents’ behaviours have not yet changed. This initial effect 
will be referred to as the arithmetical microsimulation. 
                                                 
19 Note that electricity and water are produced by public enterprises. 
20 Results are available from the authors.   22 
In order to introduce the general equilibrium effects from the CGE model to the 
microsimulation, one labour market parameter is changed in each step of the sequence 
described above. It is important to note that the simulated changes in remuneration to labour 
refer to the gross or pre-tax income. To obtain information on net or disposable income 
(after direct taxes), an arithmetical microsimulation has to be carried out (again) on the new 
results. This procedure allows us to compute effective income tax rates by incorporating 
“second round” effects (labour market and factor price changes) by accounting for 
exogenous individual and household variables which affect tax payments but are not present 
in the CGE (e.g. deductions for the number of children in households). 
An important issue is imputing the status of newly employed workers with respect to 
informal and formal employment.
21  This is addressed by randomly assigning a job to 
unemployed individuals when the unemployment rate decreases in a specific population 
segment. The informal or formal nature of this new job is crucial, since it determines whether 
labour income is taxed. To deal with this, the observed incidence of informality by sector and 
type of worker in the NHS was estimated and then the informal/formal status was randomly 
assigned on the basis of these observations. 
Finally, income tax rates on labour vary with income; they are actually endogenous, 
although the macro CGE model treats them as exogenous. When the “final” effective tax 
rates on labour income resulting from the microsimulations are compared with the initial 
shock on the CGE, by accounting for changes in the tax bases due to changes in average 
nominal wages, only slight differences were found.
22 
4. Simulations and CGE model closures 
Several simulations were carried out with the CGE model. In each simulation, a 
shock for some (or all) of the specific tax rates involved in the reform was introduced. To 
start with, the full reform was simulated including the introduction of the direct personal 
income tax, changes in VAT rates, elimination of the intermediate consumption tax and the 
health tax, changes in the ECSS rate and introduction of the direct tax on firms to replace 
the industry and trade tax. Each of these components of the reform was then simulated 
separately in order to assess the relative importance of their effects. The list of simulations 
carried out is then: 
                                                 
21 Also note that the CGE model does not endogenize this aspect of the labour market. 
22 Results are available from the authors.   23 
a)  REFORM – Simulation of the full reform 
b)  VAT  –  Simulation of the modified  VAT plus the elimination of intermediate 
consumption tax and health tax 
c)  INCTAX – Simulation of the new personal income tax that replaced the previous 
personal income tax 
d)  ECSS – Simulation of the changes to employers’ contribution to social security 
e)  FDIRTAX – Simulation of the direct personal income tax as a replacement for the 
industry and trade tax 
A savings-driven closure was adopted by maintaining a constant marginal propensity 
to save among all domestic non-government institutions. The trade balance is exogenous 
and the real exchange rate is the equilibrating variable. When analyzing tax reforms, it is 
generally assumed that government revenue does not change (Go et al., 2005). 
Nevertheless, three different government closures were tested. In the first two, government 
income was allowed to vary endogenously. The reason for this is that we primarily intended 
to assess the impact of the actual reform, including the effects of various assumptions about 
government adjustments  resulting from  the reform. The first two government closures 
adopted were thus guided by the desire to understand the effects of the reform under two 
extreme government behaviours: a) variation in government income due to the reform is 
completely absorbed by government expenditures, with constant government savings and b) 
government consumption is fixed and changes in income alter government savings. While 
neither of these closures is completely realistic, they do illustrate some aspects of the 
impacts of the actual reform in the absence of compensating mechanisms, either  by 
assigning the change in government income to additional  consumption or to additional 
savings, with no intermediate setting. 
The budget-neutral closures usually compensate for the simulated changes in direct 
taxes with a change in indirect taxes or vice versa. This type of compensation is not easy to 
interpret when simulating the full reform because changes in all major direct and indirect 
taxes are part of the reform. It is nevertheless rather interesting to assess the trade-off 
between a higher (lower) VAT and lower (higher) personal income taxes by maintaining 
fixed government savings and real government consumption. In fact, the reduction in indirect 
taxes to compensate for the introduction of direct personal income taxes has been one of 
the main features of the reform.   24 
Therefore, the full reform was simulated by holding real government consumption 
and government savings unchanged, while the VAT compensates for: introduction of the 
new structure of personal income taxes, changes in employers’  contributions  to social 
security, changes in the direct tax on firms, and all components of the reform considered 
together. In the first three cases, a proportional adjustment of the VAT rate was permitted to 
compensate for revenue gains or losses. In the full reform case, the actual change in the 
VAT rate was simulated (together with the rest of the tax changes) and an additional 
proportional adjustment in  VAT rates was permitted to compensate for variations in 
government revenues. So, this simulation allows us to estimate the number of additional 
points by which VAT rates could be reduced (or increased) if the full reform were set up to 
be revenue-neutral. Table 7 summarizes the simulations carried out and the closures used. 
As for the labour market, it is assumed that capital and labour are perfectly mobile 
across sectors but that the labour market is segmented by skill level. The supply of capital is 
fixed and is fully employed, so the average capital return is the equilibrating variable. Labour 
supply is endogenous and there is unemployment in every segment of the labour market. 
Both labour employment and wages can vary after a shock, but wage differentials are fixed 
at their initial level. 
Table 7: Simulations and macro closures 


























Flexible VAT rates, fixed gov. savings 








Note: lower case letters in the name of each simulation indicate the variable that is flexible in relation to 
government accounts: government savings (gsav), government consumption (gcons) and the value added tax 
rate (VAT).   25 
5. Results of the CGE simulations 
5.1 Government accounts 
Table 8 shows the results for the main macroeconomic aggregates, government 
accounts and labour market variables in each of the simulations carried out. 
The first two groups of simulations show the results of the actual reform for two 
alternative uses of the additional revenue. Government income as a share of GDP increases 
by 0.6 percentage points when the full reform is simulated regardless of how additional 
revenue is allocated. The new personal income tax generates a nearly 3 percentage point 
increase in government income as a share of GDP, but this is partly countered by reduced 
receipts from indirect taxes, employers’ social security contributions and taxes on profits. 
Changes in the VAT and other indirect taxes (intermediate consumption and health taxes) 
lead to the main compensating reductions in government income. 
A  significant change in the composition of tax revenue (excluding tariffs and 
contributions to social security) results from these opposing effects. Direct taxes as a share 
of total tax revenues rise from 22.3% in the baseline scenario to 33.4% when the full reform 
is simulated, while the relative importance of indirect taxes declines by  11 percentage 
points. 
Table 8 also shows the different outcomes obtained according to the allocation of the 
additional revenue. In the first group of simulations (flexible government savings), the share 
of government savings in GDP rises by 0.5 percentage points. Similarly, if the additional 
government income were used to increase government consumption, the latter would rise by 
0.5 percentage points as a share of GDP (see REFORM_gcons). As will be shown later on, 
these  situations generate different macro results. The last columns of table  8  show the 
results of the compensated simulations where budget neutrality is assumed. In the case that 
the reform is compensated by changes in VAT rates, the share of direct taxes reaches its 
highest value (34.5% of GDP). 
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VAT_        
gsav
INCTAX_        
gsav
ECSS_           
gsav
FDIRTAX_       
gsav
REFORM_      
gcons
VAT_               
gcons
INCTAX_           
gcons
ECSS_        
gcons
FDIRTAX_          
gcons
REFORM_     
vat
INCTAX_         
vat
ECSS_       
vat
FDIRTAX_         
vat
Government financing
Government Income % GDP 25.0 25.6 23.9 27.9 24.3 24.5 25.6 23.9 27.8 24.3 24.5 25.2 25.1 25.0 25.0
Government consumption % GDP 11.4 11.4 11.4 11.4 11.4 11.4 11.9 10.3 14.1 10.7 10.9 11.5 11.5 11.4 11.4
Government savings % GDP 1.6 2.1 0.4 4.5 0.8 1.0 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6
Direct taxes % tot. revenue* 22.3 33.4 24.2 32.5 22.4 20.1 33.4 24.1 32.7 22.4 20.1 34.5 39.2 21.3 19.4
Indirect taxes % tot. revenue* 77.7 66.6 75.8 67.5 77.6 79.9 66.6 75.9 67.3 77.6 79.9 65.5 60.8 78.7 80.6
Main macroeconomic aggregates
Absorption % change -- 0.9 0.3 0.1 0.5 0.0 1.1 0.0 0.9 0.3 -0.2 1.1 1.0 0.3 -0.2
Private consumption % change -- 0.3 1.7 -3.4 1.6 0.5 0.6 1.2 -2.0 1.2 0.3 1.1 0.9 0.5 -0.3
Investment % change -- 4.5 -5.6 16.2 -4.1 -2.5 1.2 1.4 -1.3 0.3 0.6 1.8 2.0 -0.4 0.1
Government consumption % change -- 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.1 -9.5 22.4 -5.9 -4.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Exports % change -- 1.8 -0.3 2.7 -0.3 -0.4 1.1 1.1 -0.8 0.6 0.2 1.5 1.6 0.0 -0.2
Imports % change -- 1.8 -0.3 2.8 -0.3 -0.4 1.2 1.2 -0.9 0.6 0.2 1.6 1.6 0.0 -0.2
GDP mp % change -- 0.9 0.3 0.1 0.5 0.0 1.1 0.0 0.9 0.3 -0.2 1.1 1.0 0.3 -0.2
Net indirect taxes % change -- 1.1 0.4 0.2 0.5 0.0 0.9 0.9 -0.9 0.8 0.2 1.1 1.3 0.2 -0.2
GDP fc % change -- 0.9 0.3 0.1 0.5 0.0 1.1 -0.2 1.2 0.2 -0.3 1.3 0.9 0.3 -0.2
Household disp. income % change -- 0.1 1.7 -3.6 1.6 0.5 0.3 1.2 -2.2 1.2 0.3 0.9 0.8 0.4 -0.3
Employment by labor type
Skilled % change -- 1.7 0.9 -0.5 1.2 0.1 2.5 -1.3 3.9 -0.1 -0.9 2.1 1.8 0.7 -0.4
Semiskilled % change -- 1.6 0.7 -0.1 1.0 0.0 1.9 -0.1 1.9 0.5 -0.4 1.9 1.7 0.5 -0.3
Unskilled % change -- 2.0 0.6 0.6 0.9 -0.1 2.0 0.5 0.7 0.9 -0.1 2.2 2.0 0.6 -0.4
Total % change -- 1.9 0.7 0.3 1.0 0.0 2.0 0.2 1.3 0.7 -0.3 2.1 1.9 0.6 -0.4
Unemployment rate by labor type
Skilled % of labour force 4.4 2.9 3.4 5.4 3.1 4.3 2.2 5.4 1.3 4.3 5.2 2.5 2.8 3.8 4.7
Semiskilled % of labour force 10.1 8.7 9.4 10.4 9.2 10.0 8.4 10.1 8.6 9.6 10.4 8.4 8.6 9.6 10.4
Unskilled % of labour force 12.0 10.2 11.4 11.6 11.1 12.0 10.2 11.5 11.4 11.2 12.1 9.9 10.1 11.5 12.3
Participation rate by labor type
Skilled % of pop.in age 81.6 81.8 81.5 82.0 81.6 81.6 81.8 81.4 82.2 81.5 81.5 81.7 81.7 81.6 81.6
Semiskilled % of pop.in age 74.8 74.9 74.8 75.1 74.8 74.8 74.9 74.8 75.1 74.8 74.8 74.8 74.8 74.8 74.9
Unskilled % of pop.in age 58.2 58.1 58.1 58.2 58.1 58.2 58.1 58.2 58.2 58.2 58.2 58.1 58.1 58.2 58.2
Factor payments 
Skilled % change -- 1.4 0.9 -0.7 1.2 0.1 2.4 -0.7 4.2 0.1 -0.5 1.9 1.6 0.5 -0.2
Semiskilled % change -- 2.1 1.1 -0.4 1.4 0.1 2.6 0.0 2.2 0.7 -0.4 2.6 2.3 0.7 -0.4
Unskilled % change -- 2.4 0.7 0.5 1.1 -0.1 2.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 -0.1 2.8 2.5 0.6 -0.4
Capital % change -- 3.2 2.1 0.3 1.0 -0.1 2.8 2.9 -1.9 1.5 0.3 4.3 6.2 -0.5 -1.1
* Total revenue excluding social security contributions and tariffs
Simulations with flexible government savings Simulations with flexible real government consumption Simulations with budget neutral assumption27 
A relevant result is the “cost” of each component of the reform in terms of VAT. In particular, 
if the INCTAX were introduced and compensated for by reducing VAT rates, the initial legal 
rates of 23% and 14% could be lowered to 15% for the base rate and 9% for the minimum 
rate. In the case of the full reform (which includes changes in other taxes and a reduction of 
VAT rates to 22% and 10%), choosing the VAT as the compensating mechanism allows the 
VAT rates to be lowered by an additional percentage point (to 21% for the basic rate and 9% 
for the minimum rate). 
5.2. Macro results 
A first result to point out is that every  simulation of the full reform has  a similar 
positive effect on GDP, regardless of which of the three government closures is adopted. It 
is important to note that assumptions with respect to the government’s use of additional 
revenue from the reforms are nevertheless very relevant. For example, the final results for 
investment absorption and public-private shares of investment differ substantially according 
to the choice of closure, a fact that has implications in a dynamic setting (not considered in 
the current study). 
When government savings are held fixed (simulations ending in gcons), the positive 
effect on GDP is mainly explained by implementation of the direct personal income tax 
(which increases fiscal revenues) and to a lesser extent by the effect of the ECSS shock. 
The increase in government income enables a 4.1% increase in real government 
consumption, which implies an increase of government consumption as a share of GDP. 
Under this assumption, investments and exports increase because changes in VAT rates 
and elimination of the intermediate consumption tax cause their prices to fall. Meanwhile, 
increasing government revenues tend to crowd out private consumption, which increases by 
just 0.6%. 
When government consumption is held fixed and government savings are allowed to 
vary endogenously (simulations ending in gsav), GDP also increases, but somewhat less so 
than in the previous closure. Every component of the reform positively affects aggregate 
activity  with the exception of  the  macro-neutral  shock on taxes on profits. Increased 
government savings due to the revenue-increasing personal income tax allows investment 
to increase by 16.2%. In this case, there is a moderate crowding out effect on investment 
(as private savings decrease).   28 
The first two closures, where the government either spends or saves the additional 
revenues, can be compared for their effects on aggregate household income. We find that 
the effects are slightly more favourable when current government consumption is allowed to 
increase. This is because value added is a high share of output in public education and 
health services. Since remuneration to labour comprises all of value added for these public 
services, households receive nearly all of the additional spending,  after intermediate 
consumption is accounted for. In the simulations with flexible government savings (ending in 
_gsav) the variation in disposable income is lower than in the flexible government 
consumption closure (ending in _gcons). Investment rises, leading to higher demand for 
construction and some tradable goods (particularly primary goods and machinery), so part of 
the increase in  demand is absorbed by imports and is  not captured by domestic 
institutions.
23 
The most interesting result is the budget-neutral simulation which allows changes in 
the tax structure to be compensated by the VAT. Changes in government accounts are not 
permitted in this case, so any variations are due to changes in the tax structure. There is 
also an increase in GDP in this case and the increase is similar to the two previous 
simulations. 
The budget-neutral scenario has  the most favourable effects on  disposable 
household income. In this case, the additional reduction in VAT rates is partly captured by 
households through lower prices. Increased disposable income leads to higher aggregate 
demand, mainly due to the combined changes involving the personal income tax and the 
VAT. This demand is met by increased imports and domestic production, with a related 
increase in factor demand. Total capital supply is fixed in this model, so increased demand 
for capital implies  higher returns. In the case of labour, increased demand is partially 
satisfied via reduced unemployment. 
The analysis of each separate effect illustrates part of the mechanisms behind these 
results. As shown in the last columns of table 8, most of the positive effect comes from 
replacing  indirect taxes  (VAT)  with  direct taxes  on household income (see INCTAX_vat 
simulation). The other positive effect arises from lower distortions on relative factor prices by 
reducing the ECSS rate and harmonizing it across sectors of activity. 
 
                                                 
23 Again, note that investment is only considered as a demand factor, as the model is static and 
therefore does not capture investment’s dynamic effect on growth.   29 
Replacing  VAT  revenues with  a direct personal income tax  increases  disposable 
income  for  all household groups except the richest decile, which amounts to  a positive 
demand shock for domestic economic activity (see table 9). Furthermore, the elimination, 
reduction or uniformization of some indirect taxes (such as the intermediate consumption 
tax, the health tax or ECSS) together with the shift towards direct taxation, tends to reduce 
price distortions on markets for good and factors.
24 As factors are assumed to be (perfectly) 
mobile across sectors, this change induces a better reallocation of resources and stimulates 
economic activity. 







Source: author’s CGE simulation results 
Direct taxation on household income could also have undesirable long-run effects for 
at least two reasons. First, we have an efficiency loss due to substitution effects between 
labour (used to purchase commodities) and leisure, although this is later shown to be 
insignificant in the present context. Secondly, and more importantly for the present case, 
progressive tax rates on household income could have negative impacts on private savings, 
with negative implications for  dynamic capital accumulation. Again, this aspect is not 
considered, as the present analysis is not dynamic. 
5.3 Labour market results 
The expected effects of the reform on the labour market are ambiguous because the 
shocks derived from its different components are not uniform across sectors or households. 
In sectors where the VAT and other indirect taxes were cut, the expected initial decline in 
prices leads to higher demand for goods and services, with a corresponding increase in 
                                                 
24 This result is highly dependent on the assumption of perfect competition. For the case of Uruguay, 
a small open economy, this assumption is reasonable for the tradable sectors (especially 
manufacturing and primary activities). However, imperfect competition would probably  be  a more 
realistic assumption for some non-tradable sectors. In these cases, the reduction in VAT rates could 
be entirely (or mostly) captured by firms and thus not lead to efficiency gains. 
Decile of HH income REFORM_  vat INCTAX_    vat ECSS_   vat FDIRTAX_    vat 
1  3.9  3.8  0.6  -0.5 
2  4.7  4.6  0.7  -0.5 
3  4.9  4.8  0.6  -0.5 
4  4.6  4.5  0.6  -0.5 
5  4.6  4.5  0.6  -0.4 
6  4.2  4.1  0.5  -0.4 
7  3.6  3.6  0.4  -0.3 
8  2.5  2.4  0.3  -0.3 
9  1.2  1.2  0.2  -0.2 
10  -2.8  -2.7  0.0  -0.1   30 
factor demand. However, the negative effect on factor demand in sectors where the VAT 
increases could counter the positive effect in the first group of sectors. There is a similar 
situation with respect to the decline in demand for goods and services from high income 
households due to the new personal income tax, in that it could outweigh the positive effect 
on demand from lower income households. Finally, changes in ECSS also have different 
effects across sectors. Table 10 shows the results of all these shocks on each factor market 
for each of the three government closures. 
The full reform has practically no effect on labour supply. We find that a negative 
income effect of the  personal income tax (which more than counteracts  the substitution 
effect) only leads to a very limited increase in the supply of labour.
25 
The full reform’s impact on employment and unemployment are substantial for each 
of the three government closures, however, due to the positive effect on overall economic 
activity. There is also a substitution effect that results from a general reduction of the ECSS 
which reduces labour costs  and stimulates labour demand in every sector  except  for 
manufacturing (whose tax rate increased). In fact, table 10  shows that when  the ECSS 
shock is considered alone, the decline in labour demand in the manufacturing sector ranges 
from 3.2% to 1.7% depending on the government closure adopted, while labour demand 
grows in nearly every other sector of activity.
26 The change in ECSS also causes overall 
employment to increase by between 0.6% and 1%. 
The reduction of the VAT rate and the elimination of the tax on intermediate 
consumption of goods also positively affect overall employment regardless of the closure 
adopted. As indicated above, elimination and/or reduction of these highly distortionary taxes 
(particularly the intermediate consumption tax) induces  a better allocation of resources, 
stimulating activity growth. When government savings is the adjustment variable, the effects 
of the tax change on the labour market are similar to those seen for the ECSS shock, albeit 
for different reasons: all private sectors except for construction and primary activities 
increase their demand for labour. When government consumption is allowed to adjust, all 
                                                 
25 Note that the direct tax rate is not endogenous in this model. Further variations in the marginal tax 
rate due to changes in labour income are therefore not captured, a fact that could affect these results. 
Nevertheless,  as stated above,  the  differences  in  the  “final” effective tax rates on labour income 
arising from the various microsimulations with the initial shock on the CGE were found to be quite 
small. 
26 When government consumption is allowed to decrease, employment also decreases in the public 
sector in response to revenue losses caused by the ECSS shock. When government savings is the 
adjustment variable, employment in the construction sector is also affected.   31 
sectors increase their labour demand except for the public sector. In this case, it is worth 
noting that the  manufacturing and construction sectors benefit most:  the share  of 
intermediate consumption of goods  is relatively high  in both sectors, so they are  both 
favoured by elimination of the intermediate consumption tax (see table 10). 
This stands in contrast with the effect of the INCTAX-only simulation on employment. 
The effect is negative in the private sector due to a substantial increase on the overall tax 
burden on households which reduces private consumption and savings. The adjustment via 
government accounts (by either allowing consumption or savings to increase) compensates 
for  this negative effect,  with a final result of  an increase in aggregate activity and 
employment. However, neither closure is reasonable in this case because personal income 
tax receipts are quite high and it is not realistic to consider such an increase in the tax 
burden without compensation. It is thus  more interesting to consider the budget-neutral 
closure by compensating for the new personal income tax with a uniform reduction of VAT 
rates. The direct negative shock on the aggregate household budget is then compensated 
by the positive effect of new (lower) prices, stimulating aggregate private consumption and 
investment and increasing labour demand. 
Although the final result of the full reform is a  1.9-2.1%  increase in overall 
employment, the choice of assumptions for government closure affects the change in labour 
demand by skill level. Full implementation of the reform together with an increase in public 
services is a skill-biased scenario because skilled labour is relatively intensively used in 
public services. When the full reform is accompanied by an increase in government savings, 
however, the bias is in favour of unskilled workers due to increased demand in the 
construction sector. Finally, the budget-neutral scenario shows a more uniform increase in 
labour demand by skill level (see table 10). 
Employment growth with a stable labour supply leads to a substantial 2 percentage 
point reduction in overall unemployment in the full reform scenario under each alternative 
closure. The largest reduction in unemployment is achieved in the budget-neutral scenario, 
with unemployment among unskilled workers falling by the most. 
Increased demand in the full reform scenario also leads to higher wages for all types 
of labour and under all  three closures. In the budget-neutral scenario, increased private 
demand also raises demand for capital, leading to an increase in capital returns. Although 
the ECSS shock negatively impacts capital demand via a substitution effect, this slight effect 
is more than compensated for by the positive impact of the increase in aggregate demand. 32 
Table 10: Labour demand by aggregated sector of activity (percentage change with respect to base (%)) 
  Simulations with flexible government consumption  Simulations with flexible government savings 
Simulations with budget neutral 
assumption 
  REFORM_gsav 
INCTAX    
_gsav 
ECSS   
_gsav 
TVA    
_gsav 




INCTAX    
_gcons 
ECSS   
_gcons 
TVA    
_gcons 
FDIRTAX    
_gcons 
REFORM   
_tva 
INCTAX    
_tva 
ECSS   
_tva 
FDIRTAX    
_tva 
Primary sectors  3.1  2.1      1.4     -0.3     -0.3  2.4  -1.4  2.4  1.1  0.3  3.3  3.3  1.2  -0.5 
Manufacturing  1.6  4.6  -3.2  0.9  -0.7  0.5  -1.5  -1.7  3.4  0.4  1.2  2.5  -2.6  -0.3 
Construction  5.9  12.4  -1.4  -3.8  -1.9  3.1  -2.2  2.4  2.1  0.7  4.1  3.2  1.1  -0.3 
Pub. administration 
& pub. services  0.1  -0.2  0.1  0.1  0.0  4.0  21.2  -5.5  -8.9  -4.0  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0 
Commerce  2.1  -1.6  2.3  1.2  0.3  2.0  -2.1  2.5  1.4  0.3  2.8  1.9  1.4  -0.4 
Private education 
and health  1.9  -2.8  2.0  2.4  0.5  2.1  -1.6  1.7  1.9  0.3  2.6  1.2  0.9  -0.3 
Other services  1.4  -2.6  2.5  1.3  0.4  1.4  -2.4  2.4  1.2  0.3  2.2  2.0  1.3  -0.5 
Total  1.9  0.3  1.0  0.7  0.0  2.0  1.3  0.7  0.2  -0.3  2.1  1.9  0.6  -0.4 
                                           
  Source: author’s CGE model results 
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5.4 Sensitivity analysis of key parameters 
Robustness of the key results was tested by a sensitivity analysis of key parameters in the CGE model. 
For the main simulation of the full reform with the budget-neutrality assumption, the elasticities of substitution 
between labour and capital were allowed to vary between half and 1.5 times their range of values. Similarly, 
elasticities of substitution between labour types varied between half and twice their range of values and wage 
elasticity of labour supply varied between twice and three times their range of values. Finally, income elasticity 
of commodity demand varied between 0.8 and 1.2 times its range of values (see tables A.1 to A.3 for initial 
elasticity values). 
The analysis shows that the main results are indeed robust to variations in these key parameters. The 
full reform’s positive impact on GDP is maintained in the sensitivity analysis. Other key macro aggregates such 
as private consumption growth or government revenue are almost unchanged across a range of values for 
elasticities of substitution between labour factors, income elasticities or wage elasticities of labour supply. Only 
variations in the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour generate some variations in the main 
macroeconomic aggregates, but the sign of the overall results remain unchanged (see table 11). 
The overall beneficial effects on employment and unemployment are also maintained in the sensitivity 
analysis. Minor variations can be observed when a lower elasticity of substitution between capital and labour is 
assumed. In this case, the labour demand effect resulting from reduced ECSS is smaller. Wage and 
employment growth is lower as a result, but remains positive.  
Finally, the wage elasticity of labour supply does not seem to be a strong determinant of our main 
results. 
 
6. Microsimulation results 
Table 12 shows the results of the tax reform microsimulations according to the outcomes obtained from 
the CGE model for each of the three closures mentioned above. The results are obtained from the sequence of 
steps described in section 3.3 and report the change in each indicator in each phase compared to the previous 
one. Table 13 shows the microsimulation results of the reforms’ effects on per capita household income by 
decile that result from the “next day” effects (arithmetical microsimulation) and due to changes in labour market 
indicators and factor prices provided by the CGE model (“general equilibrium” effects). 
The  first step  was to carry out  the arithmetical microsimulation, which amounts to  re-estimating 
disposable income under the new direct income tax structure. The new direct income tax leads to a 1.2% 
reduction in mean per capita household income and a 1.5% decrease in average labour income. Extreme 
poverty is reduced by 0.01 percentage points (hereafter pp) and moderate poverty by 0.33 pp. The poverty gap 
ratio and the severity of poverty also decline, respectively by 0.10 pp and 0.04 pp, as reported in table 12. 34 
Table 11: Main results from sensitivity analysis 







































Government financing                                  
Government income  % GDP  25.0  25.2  25.1  25.2  25.2  25.2  25.2  25.2  25.2  25.2 
Government consumption  % GDP  11.4  11.5  11.4  11.5  11.5  11.5  11.5  11.5  11.5  11.5 
Direct taxes  % tot. rev*  22.3  34.5  35.0  34.7  34.8  34.8  34.8  34.8  34.8  34.8 
Indirect taxes  % tot. rev*  77.7  65.5  65.0  65.3  65.2  65.2  65.2  65.2  65.2  65.2 
Main macroeconomic aggregates                              
Absorption  % ch  --  1.1  0.8  1.2  1.1  1.1  1.1  1.1  1.1  1.0 
Private consumption  % ch  --  1.1  0.6  1.3  1.1  1.1  1.1  1.1  1.1  1.0 
Investment  % ch  --  1.8  2.1  1.7  1.8  1.9  1.8  1.8  1.8  1.9 
Government consumption  % ch  --  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Exports  % ch  --  1.5  1.3  1.7  1.5  1.5  1.5  1.5  1.5  1.5 
Imports  % ch  --  1.6  1.4  1.7  1.6  1.6  1.6  1.6  1.6  1.6 
GDP mp  % ch  --  1.1  0.8  1.2  1.1  1.1  1.1  1.1  1.0  1.0 
Net indirect taxes  % ch  --  1.1  1.0  1.5  1.3  1.3  1.3  1.3  1.3  1.3 
GDP fc  % ch  --  1.3  0.7  1.2  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0 
Household disp. income  % ch  --  0.9  0.4  1.1  0.9  0.9  0.9  0.9  0.9  0.9 
Employment by labour type                              
Skilled  % ch  --  2.1  1.5  2.4  2.0  2.2  2.1  2.1  2.1  2.1 
Semiskilled  % ch  --  1.9  1.3  2.2  1.9  1.8  1.9  1.9  1.9  1.9 
Unskilled  % ch  --  2.2  1.6  2.6  2.3  2.1  2.2  2.2  2.1  2.1 
Total  % ch  --  2.1  1.6  2.5  2.2  2.1  2.1  2.1  2.1  2.1 
Unemployment rate by labour type                              
Skilled  % of lab   4.4  2.5  3.0  2.2  2.6  2.4  2.5  2.5  2.6  2.6 
Semiskilled  % of lab   10.1  8.4  8.9  8.1  8.4  8.4  8.4  8.4  8.4  8.4 
Unskilled  % of lab   12.0  9.9  10.5  9.6  9.9  10.0  9.9  9.9  9.9  9.9 
Participation rate by labour type                              
Skilled  % pop  81.6  81.7  81.7  81.7  81.7  81.7  81.7  81.7  81.8  81.8 
Semiskilled  % pop  74.8  74.8  74.8  74.8  74.8  74.8  74.8  74.8  74.8  74.8 
Unskilled  % pop  58.2  58.1  58.1  58.1  58.1  58.1  58.1  58.1  58.1  58.1 
Factor payments                                  
Skilled  % ch  --  1.9  1.3  2.4  1.8  2.1  1.9  1.9  1.9  1.9 
Semiskilled  % ch  --  2.6  1.8  3.1  2.7  2.6  2.6  2.6  2.6  2.6 
Unskilled  % ch  --  2.8  2.0  3.2  2.9  2.7  2.8  2.8  2.8  2.8 
Capital  % ch  --  4.3  4.9  3.8  4.3  4.2  4.3  4.3  4.2  4.2 
* Total revenue excluding social security contributions and tariffs                      
Source: author’s CGE model results 
The arithmetical microsimulation finds a decrease in income inequality. The Gini index of per capita 
household income falls by approximately 0.010 points and the Gini index of per capita labour income falls by 
0.013 points. Average per capita household income increases moderately in the first eight deciles
27 (table 13) 
and decreases in the two richest deciles (-0.7% and -4.2% respectively). These results are clearly driven by 
the greater progressiveness of the new direct income tax. Per capita household income grows by an average 
of 0.2% in the 1
st decile and 0.6% in the 2
nd decile. The new income tax structure is thus shown to have smaller 
effects on the poorest decile, a result that can be explained by the fact that there was already a minimum 
taxable income on labour.
28 
                                                 
27 Initial incomes brackets based on pre-reform rankings. 
28 Moreover, informal labour is more common in the poorest decile and changes in this due to the reform are not modeled. 35 
Table 12: Microsimulation results of the full reform under different macroeconomic closures of the model on the 








Poverty: FGT(2) Gini of PCHI GINI of LI
Base Indicators 6,425 8,148 2.29 27.88 9.34 4.31 0.453 0.498
(a) Arithmetical Microsimulation -1.2% -1.5% -0.01 -0.33 -0.10 -0.04 -0.009 -0.013
Simulations with flexible government savings
(b) Labour Market Changes (Gen. Eq. Effects) 1.5% 1.8% -0.16 -0.65 -0.32 -0.18 -0.001 0.001
   i) Participation Rate Change 0.0% 0.0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.000
    ii) Unemployment Rate Change 0.4% 0.0% -0.10 -0.29 -0.14 -0.09 -0.001 0.002
     iii) Employment Structure Change 0.0% -0.1% 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.000 0.000
      iv) Wage Structure Change 0.0% 0.0% 0.00 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 0.000 -0.001
       v) Wage Rate Change 0.9% 1.8% -0.07 -0.35 -0.17 -0.09 0.000 -0.001
        vi) Capital Price Change  0.1% 0.0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.000
(c) Total Microsimulation Effects = (a)+(b) 0.3% 0.3% -0.16 -0.98 -0.43 -0.22 -0.010 -0.012
Final Counterfactual Indicators 6,441 8,169 2.12 26.90 8.91 4.09 0.443 0.486
Simulations with flexible real government consumption
(b) Labour Market Changes (Gen. Equilib. Effects) 1.8% 2.2% -0.18 -0.82 -0.38 -0.20 -0.001 0.000
   i) Participation Rate Change 0.0% 0.0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.000
    ii) Unemployment Rate Change 0.5% 0.0% -0.10 -0.32 -0.15 -0.09 -0.001 0.002
     iii) Employment Structure Change 0.0% 0.0% 0.00 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 0.000 -0.001
      iv) Wage Structure Change 0.0% 0.0% 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.000
       v) Wage Rate Change 1.2% 2.2% -0.07 -0.46 -0.22 -0.11 0.000 -0.001
        vi) Capital Price Change  0.1% 0.0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.000
(c) Total Microsimulation Effects = (a)+(b) 0.6% 0.8% -0.18 -1.14 -0.48 -0.25 -0.009 -0.013
Final Counterfactual Indicators 6,463 8,208 2.11 26.73 8.85 4.06 0.443 0.485
Simulations with budget neutral assumption
(b) Labour Market Changes (Gen. Eq. Effects) 1.8% 2.1% -0.17 -0.80 -0.37 -0.20 -0.001 0.001
   i) Participation Rate Change 0.0% 0.0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.000
    ii) Unemployment Rate Change 0.5% 0.0% -0.11 -0.33 -0.16 -0.10 -0.001 0.002
     iii) Employment Structure Change 0.0% -0.1% 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.000 0.000
      iv) Wage Structure Change 0.0% 0.0% 0.00 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.000 -0.001
       v) Wage Rate Change 1.2% 2.2% -0.06 -0.48 -0.21 -0.11 0.000 -0.001
        vi) Capital Price Change  0.1% 0.0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.000 0.000
(c) Total Microsimulation Effects = (a)+(b) 0.6% 0.7% -0.18 -1.13 -0.48 -0.24 -0.009 -0.012
Final Counterfactual Indicators 6,461 8,201 2.11 26.75 8.86 4.06 0.443 0.486
Mean of PCHI 
(after direct 
taxes)





Moderate Poverty: FGT(a) indicators Inequality36 
Table 13: Counterfactual changes in mean per capita household income by decile, due to reforms, by different government closures 
 
Simulations with flexible government 
savings
Simulations with flexible real 
government consumption





































1 1,448 1,452 0.2% 1,484 2.2% 2.5% 1,49 2.6% 2.9% 1,488 2.5% 2.7%
2 2,386 2,401 0.6% 2,453 2.1% 2.8% 2,458 2.4% 3.0% 2,458 2.4% 3.0%
3 3,216 3,241 0.8% 3,301 1.9% 2.7% 3,311 2.2% 2.9% 3,311 2.2% 3.0%
4 4,064 4,095 0.8% 4,167 1.7% 2.5% 4,179 2.0% 2.8% 4,178 2.0% 2.8%
5 4,996 5,029 0.7% 5,107 1.5% 2.2% 5,124 1.9% 2.6% 5,119 1.8% 2.5%
6 6,091 6,125 0.6% 6,21 1.4% 1.9% 6,231 1.7% 2.3% 6,228 1.7% 2.2%
7 7,48 7,51 0.4% 7,604 1.3% 1.7% 7,629 1.6% 2.0% 7,627 1.6% 2.0%
8 9,455 9,46 0.1% 9,578 1.3% 1.3% 9,607 1.5% 1.6% 9,604 1.5% 1.6%
9 12,883 12,792 -0.7% 12,933 1.1% 0.4% 12,974 1.4% 0.7% 12,965 1.4% 0.6%
10 26,441 25,32 -4.2% 25,589 1.1% -3.2% 25,667 1.4% -2.9% 25,647 1.3% -3.0% 
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The counterfactual changes in wages, unemployment, labour supply and 
employment by sector of activity as derived from the CGE model result from changes in 
agents’ behaviour that affect household income. These effects are in addition to the “next 
day” effect. The microsimulation results of these counterfactual changes thus represent pure 
“general equilibrium effects”. 
The general equilibrium effects show an increase in mean per capita household 
income and mean labour income. These effects compensate for the “next day” reduction in 
income  found  in the arithmetical microsimulation. The most important counterfactual 
changes driving these results are reduced unemployment and growth in mean wages and 
capital income indicated by every CGE simulation. Moreover, general equilibrium effects 
strengthen the observed “next day” reduction of the incidence of poverty, the poverty gap 
and the severity of poverty. The size of these effects is much greater than the “next day” 
effect. The average increase in the wage rate and the reduction of unemployment are the 
most important labour market changes underlying this poverty reduction. As for inequality 
indicators, general equilibrium effects lead to a minor additional reduction of the Gini index 
for total household income (in the same direction of the arithmetical simulation) and do not 
affect the Gini index for labour income. 
The simulated change in household income across the income distribution shows an 
interesting trend. The “next day” effects of the tax reform are progressive, with a significant 
reduction in the richest decile’s after-tax income. The “general equilibrium” effects with 
respect to per capita household income move in the opposite direction: every decile sees 
income increase regardless of the CGE closure used (see figure 2). 
As mentioned above, the most important change behind this result is the 
approximately 2 pp reduction in the unemployment rate, with particularly notable effects for 
the unskilled workers that are predominant in lower income households. The other main 
counterfactual change that explains this result is average real wage growth of about 2%. 
The counterfactual indicators of these key labour market parameters are very similar in each 
of  the three government closures used in the CGE model, so the full reform’s general 
equilibrium effects on poverty and inequality are very similar in each simulation. In sum, 
substantial  general equilibrium effects are robust to the type of government closure 
assumed in the CGE model and reinforce the observed poverty and inequality reduction 
obtained from the “next day” simulation.   38 
Figure 2. After-tax per capita household income by decile and type of 
microsimulation. Full reform (variation w.r.t base)  
   
Source: Author’s CGE microsimulation results 
7. Concluding Remarks 
First, it is important to remark that full implementation of the 2007 Uruguayan tax 
reform has significant general equilibrium effects. Taken together, they tend to reinforce the 
progressive  nature of the “next day”  effects  of implementing  its main policy, i.e. the 
introduction of a direct personal income tax to replace the previous wage and pensions tax. 
Although this is an expected result, it reinforces the importance of evaluating these types of 
macro reforms using methodologies that account for potential reallocation of resources due 
to changes in prices of goods and factors due to the policy. 
Second, the main results relating to the effects of full implementation of the reforms 
on aggregate economic  activity, employment, poverty and inequality are robust to the 
alternative assumptions about  government closure, although there are clear differences 
regarding  investment  absorption structure  and  public-private  shares of investment  in 
addition to possible dynamic effects that are not captured in this study. The results are also 
robust to variation of key parameters. 
An important result is that the full reform increases  GDP and employment even 
though it actually increases the tax burden. In other words, when government revenues   39 
increase due to the tax reform (by allowing an increase in either government provision of 
public services or government savings), the reform also results in employment and wage 
growth and reduced  unemployment, generating positive general equilibrium effects on 
average household income and poverty. This  obviously  does not mean that  the 
government’s use of  additional  revenue  is irrelevant. The simulations that alter  either 
government  consumption or savings accounts tend to crowd out private consumption or 
savings, with probable future negative effects on private capital accumulation. When the 
government budget is held fixed and additional reductions of the VAT rate are allowed, the 
reform generates the most  positive effects  in relation to  economic activity,  poverty and 
inequality. 
This result is linked to the fact that the reform generally reduces or eliminates taxes 
on some goods and factors and harmonizes tax rates across categories for others. This is 
done though the intermediate consumption tax, the health tax, the VAT and ECSS, with any 
revenue losses being compensated for with an increase in direct taxation.  Reduction, 
elimination or harmonization of these taxes tends to reduce price distortions of goods and 
factors. In a context of (perfect) factor mobility across economic activities this leads to a 
better reallocation of resources, stimulating an expansion of economic activity. 
Although direct taxation on household income could also be distortionary because of 
the efficiency loss associated with substitution between labour (used to purchase 
commodities) and leisure, the simulated models suggest that the shift towards direct taxation 
in Uruguay is desirable from the efficiency perspective. Despite an elastic labour supply in 
the model (i.e., there is some substitution between labour and leisure), the final simulated 
changes in participation rates were insignificant. It should be noted that this may result from 
the nature of labour supply in the macro model, which is defined in terms of representative 
individuals and not in terms of working hours. A future analysis could improve on  this 
weakness by adjusting an econometric model of labour supply to the NHS microdata and 
then link it to the CGE (see for example Robilliard, Bourguignon and Robinson (2001)). 
We also find that the joint effect of the new personal income tax and a compensatory 
change in VAT rates leads to a significant increase in disposable income for all household 
groups except for the richest decile. This has positive effects on aggregate consumption 
(and levels of economic activity) and reduces both the incidence of poverty and the Gini 
index by about one percent. The general equilibrium effects of the full reform include an 
increase in aggregate disposable  household income that compensates for  the reduction   40 
obtained by the application of the personal income tax ignoring other components of the 
reform and economic agents’ responses to the reform. 
Moreover, the general equilibrium effects strengthen the reduction of the incidence of 
poverty, the poverty gap and the severity of poverty exclusively due to the new personal 
income tax, without behavioural responses. The magnitude of the general equilibrium effects 
is significantly greater than the “next day” effects. 
The  1-point reduction of the Gini inequality  coefficient  is  entirely due to the 
progressive nature of the direct income tax: households in the richest decile are the clear 
“losers” from the reform. However, the general equilibrium effects of the full reform do not 
play a significant role in this regard. 
The main redistributive effects of the reform come from the direct impact of the new 
(progressive) personal income tax. Nevertheless, given that individuals in the lower half of 
the income distribution currently face a very low effective tax rate, further changes to the 
minimum taxable income threshold would have a limited role in terms of redistribution. 
Finally, the results also indicate that VAT rates could be lowered further to make the 
reform budget neutral. When the full reform is compensated by changes in VAT rates, the 
VAT rates could be lowered by an additional percentage point, to 21% for the basic rate and 
9% for the minimum rate. A main result is that, under an assumption of budget-neutrality, 
and when additional reductions in the VAT rate are permitted, the reform generates a larger 
positive effect on aggregate  economic activity and leads to the best results in terms of 
poverty and inequality. This suggests that further reductions in VAT rates are desirable both 
with respect to efficiency and equity.   41 
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Annex – Parameters used in the CGE Model  
Table A.1: Trade and production elasticities 
   Armington 












Primary except livestock  0.9  1.2  0.5  0.7 
Livestock  0.9  1.2  0.5  0.7 
Meat, fruit & veg ind., 
beverages  1.53  2.5  0.5  0.9 
Mills, sugar and vegetable 
oils  0.48  2.5  0.5  0.9 
Dairy  0.76  2.5  0.5  0.9 
Other food industry   0.97  2.5  0.5  0.9 
Other manufacturing  2.05  2.5  0.5  0.9 
Press  2.05  2.5  0.5  0.7 
Petroleum refining  0.75  2.5  0.5  0.6 
Pharmacy  1.52  2.5  0.5  0.7 
Metal products & machinery  2.05  2.5  0.5  0.9 
Electricity and gas  0.9  1.2  0.5  0.9 
Water  0.9  1.2  0.5  0.9 
Construction   0.9  1.2  0.7  0.9 
Commerce  0.9  1.2  0.6  0.9 
Hotels  0.9  1.2  0.6  0.9 
Services  0.9  1.2  0.6  0.9 
Passenger transport  0.9  1.2  0.7  0.9 
Communications  0.9  1.2  0.6  0.9 
Financial services  0.9  1.2  0.6  0.9 
Public administration  0.9  1.2  0.6  0.9 
Private education  0.9  1.2  0.6  0.9 
Health – hospitals  0.9  1.2  0.6  0.9 
Other health services  0.9  1.2  0.6  0.9 
Source: 
1Based on Flores and Cassoni (2010); 
2Laens and Llambi (2008); 
3,4Based on authors’ own estimations 
for manufacturing, construction and services   44 









Skilled   0.120  0.034 
Semiskilled  0.101  0.139 
Unskilled  0.080  0.145 
Source: Based on Bucheli and Gonzalez (2007) 
 
Table A.3: Income elasticities of commodity demand 
   Deciles of household income 
















9  Wealthiest 
Primary exc. 
livestock  1.00  1.00  1.00  0.90  0.89  0.88  0.87  0.85  0.84  0.84 
Meat, fr.&veg 
ind.,bev.  1.00  1.00  1.00  0.90  0.89  0.88  0.87  0.85  0.84  0.84 
Mills, sugar, veg. oils  1.00  1.00  1.00  0.90  0.89  0.88  0.87  0.85  0.84  0.84 
Dairy  1.00  1.00  1.00  0.90  0.89  0.88  0.87  0.85  0.84  0.84 
Other food industry   1.00  1.00  1.00  0.90  0.89  0.88  0.87  0.85  0.84  0.84 
Other manufacturing  1.03  1.02  1.02  1.02  1.02  1.01  1.01  1.01  1.00  1.00 
Press  1.03  1.02  1.02  1.02  1.02  1.01  1.01  1.01  1.01  1.01 
Petroleum refining  1.01  1.01  1.00  0.98  0.98  0.97  0.97  0.87  0.84  0.84 
Pharmacy  1.04  1.04  1.02  1.03  1.02  1.00  1.00  1.00  0.99  0.99 
Metal prod, 
machinery  1.07  1.05  1.04  1.03  1.03  1.02  1.02  1.02  1.01  1.01 
Electricity and gas  1.01  1.01  1.00  0.98  0.98  0.97  0.97  0.87  0.84  0.84 
Water  1.01  1.01  1.00  0.98  0.98  0.97  0.97  0.87  0.84  0.84 
Construction  1.01  1.01  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00 
Commerce  1.02  1.02  1.01  0.99  0.98  0.98  0.97  0.95  0.94  0.94 
Hotels  1.05  1.03  1.02  1.02  1.02  1.01  1.01  1.01  1.00  1.00 
Services  1.05  1.04  1.04  1.03  1.03  1.02  1.02  1.02  1.02  1.01 
Passenger transport  1.03  1.01  1.01  1.01  1.00  1.00  0.99  0.99  0.99  0.99 
Communications  1.01  1.01  1.00  0.98  0.98  0.97  0.97  0.87  0.84  0.84 
Financial services  1.05  1.03  1.02  1.02  1.02  1.01  1.01  1.01  1.00  1.00 
Private education  1.04  1.04  1.04  1.03  1.03  1.03  1.03  1.02  1.02  1.02 
Health – hospitals  1.04  1.04  1.02  1.03  1.02  1.00  1.00  1.00  0.99  0.99 
Other health services  1.04  1.04  1.02  1.03  1.02  1.00  1.00  1.00  0.99  0.99 
 Source: Based on González (2003) 